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Bankruptcy-Burden of Proof in Contempt Proceedings for Non-
Compliance with Turnover Order-Creditors filed an involuntary
petition against defendant, and on January 19, 1944, he was adjudicated
a bankrupt. Assets were traced into defendant's possession as of the date
of the petition, and the trustee applied for a turnover order. The bank-
rupt denied his present possession of the assets, but the referee found he
had failed to rebut the presumption of continued possession and ordered
him to pay $23,000 to the trustee. This order was affirmed December 29,
1947. The banrupt failed to pay, and the trustee applied for a contempt
order. At the hearing the bankrupt again denied his present possession
of this sum and gave evidence of his modest manner of living which tended
to corroborate his denial. The court found the defendant's evidence cred-
ible, but insufficient to overcome the presumption of his present ability to
comply with the turnover order, since a bankrupt would not likely ex-
hibit signs of affluence. The order was granted, February 9, 1949. In re
Sussman, 85 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
The summary turnover procedure' has been fashioned by the bank-
ruptcy courts in order to efficiently administer bankrupt's estates. If it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that a bankrupt has improper
possession of assets, an order may be made, directing him to turn such
assets over to the trustee.2 Unless the bankrupt adequately justifies his
failure to comply with this order, he may be punished for civil contempt.3
Although criminal penalties are provided for concealment of assets,4 the
courts have recognized that criminal prosecutions do not recover the con-
cealed assets. To obtain a turnover order, the trustee has the burden of
proving by "clear and convincing" evidence not only that the assets sought
to be recovered were within the bankrupt's possession at the time of bank-
ruptcy, but that this possession exists at the issuance of the turnover order.5
However, since evidence of this nature is exceptionally difficult to obtain,0
the trustee is given the benefit of a presumption that assets traced into a
person's recent possession remain there till the contrary is satisfactorily
explained7 The force of this presumption does not diminish with the pas-
sage of time, s or vary with the circumstances of the case,9 but is rigidly
1. See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 23.10 (14th ed. 1940).
2. Bankruptcy courts are authorized to issue turnover orders by §§2(a)7 and
2(a)15 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 843 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)7, 11(a)15
(1940). Such authority can be delegated to referees by § 38, 52 STAT. 857-858 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 66 (1940). A turnover order is an exercise of the summary jurisdiction
granted by §23, 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §46 (1940).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) 13 (1940) specifically authorizes fine and imprisonment for
disobedience of all lawful orders.
4. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 29(b), 52 STAT. 855-856 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1940).
5. E.g., Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Cohen v. Jeskowitz, 144
F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1944). Contra: Price v. Kosmin, 149 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1945)
(proof of the bankrupt's possession at the date of the petition sufficient for issuance
of turnover order).
6. See McGovern, Aspects of the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy, 9 FORD-
HAm L. REv. 313, 332-333 (1940).
7. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 382 (3d ed. 1940).
8. E.g., Marin v. Ellis, 15 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1926).
9. E.g., Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1945).
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applied as a procedural device which forces the bankrupt to come forward
and deny his possession of the assets.10 A sworn denial is usually in-
sufficient; the bankrupt in the usual case may only rebut this presumption
by affirmatively showing a disposition of the assets, but as this amounts
to an admission of criminal liability, his reticence is natural. In the recent
case of Maggio v. Zeita,"1 the Supreme Court affirmed the turnover order
as res judicata on the issue of the bankrupt's possession and ability to
comply as of that date, but said the bankrupt should be permitted, in the
later contempt proceedings, to deny his present possession and give credible
evidence of current conditions which tend to show his present lack of pos-
session. The court felt such evidence, together with the time elapsed since
the issuance of the turnover order, might be sufficient to show that the
bankrupt's failure to comply was not a willful disobedience. The court in
the instant case by presuming that a bankrupt who was concealing assets
would not exhibit signs of affluence, made it highly improbable that a
bankrupt can overcome the presumption of his present ability to comply
other than by showing disposition of the assets.
In the contempt proceedings, the bankrupt may not give evidence
which collaterally attacks the adjudication that he was in present posses-
sion of the assets at the issuance of the turnover order. Prior to the
Maggio case, only that evidence which showed a disposition of the assets
by the bankrupt subsequent to the turnover order was admissible on the
issue of his present ability to comply with that order.1 2 While admitting
the evidence of the bankrupt's present conditions, the court in the instant
case felt the Maggio doctrine only required it to consider that evidence.
The court evidently did not share the disapproval of the use of the rigid
presumption,13 and found the bankrupt's evidence insufficient to rebut it.
The entire turnover procedure is directed toward the speedy recovery and
restitution of property, and in balancing the hardship imposed on a bank-
rupt who chooses to be committed rather than disclose his theft against the
practical efficacy of this presumption in recovering assets for creditors,'
4
it would seem the court rightly decided in favor of the latter. By refusing
to use the Maggio doctrine to ameliorate the rigors of the presumption,
the court has demonstrated that the cure must be effected at the turnover
stage, and not at the expense of beclouding the doctrine of res judicata
in proceedings for civil contempt.
Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Separate But Equal and the
Fifth Amendment-A Negro citizen sued the Air Terminal Services,
Inc. for damages resulting when plaintiff was refused service in a dining
10. E.g., Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1942). See, for a collec-
tion of cases, McGovern, supra note 6, at 321-329.
11. 333 U.S. 56 (1948), commented on in HANNA & MAcLACHLAN, CASES AND
MArRIALS ON ClRTOR'S RIGHTS 324 (4th ed. 1949); 46 MicH. L. REv. 933 (1948).
12. E.g., Robbins v. Gottbetter, 134 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1943). The interval be-
tween the date of the turnover order and the date of the contempt proceeding was
approximately 1532 months; in the Maggio case it was 20 months.
13. Judge Frank, in In re Luma Camera Service, 157 F.2d 951 at 953 (2d Cir.
1946); quoted by Justice Black, (concurring opinion) in Maggio v. Zeitz, supra.
'We would hold that a turnover proceeding may not, via a fiction, be substituted for
a criminal prosecution so as to deprive a man of a basic constitutional right, the right
of 'trial by jury."
14. "Nor am I persuaded that the creditors of thieving bankrupts should be
curtailed in employing the only means of obtaining restitution and one which fre-
quently results in substantial recoveries." Judge Augustus Hand, in Robbins v.
Gottbetter, supra, at 845 (concurring opinion).
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room at the Washington National Airport because of her race. Plaintiff
averred that segregation at the airport was a denial of her constitutional
rights, and that the eating accommodations furnished whites and negroes
were unequal. The airport, although situated within the boundaries of
Virginia, is owned by the United States and under exclusive federal juris-
diction.' The United States granted to defendant the concession to operate
restaurant facilities at the airport; the agreement specifically provided for
a separate cafeteria for colored persons. 2 On motion to dismiss, the court
held that separate restaurant facilities were not unconstitutional, but that
furnishing eating accommodations not substantially equal to those offered
whites would deprive plaintiff of her rights without due process in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Nash v. Air Terminal Services, Inc., 85
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment relates to federal
governmental action and not to action by states
3 or by private persons.4
Since the defendant's restaurants were operated on public property under a
concession from the Government, it was considered that the concessionaire
operated the facility in the place of the Federal Government. The instant
segregation, pursuant to federal statute and under a federal executive's
instructions,3 was held to be, in effect, Governmental action.6 Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that segregation, even by the Federal Government, is
not violative of the Constitution; but the only case cited in support of this
conclusion related to segregation imposed by regulation of a private car-
rier which was held not to be state action, hence not to violate the Four-
teenth Amendment.7 The Court has thus unquestioningly 8 extended to
the Fifth Amendment the doctrine, developed to uphold state action when
attacked as a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment,9 that separate facilities for negroes and whites are consti-
tutional if substantially equal. In cases in which the Supreme Court has
held segregation unlawful the decision has usually been based on a finding
that the facilities furnished negroes were unequal to those provided for
whites.10 However, there is a difference in emphasis between the consti-
tutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of law. The equal
protection clause prohibits arbitrary classifications of persons and only re-
quires equal treatment of all individuals. But when the due process clause
1. 59 STAT. 552, 553 (1945) ; Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of 1946,
c. 26, p. 46.
2. Agreement between the United States and Air Terminal Services. See instant
case at 547.
3. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1883). The due process requirement
is imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Teague v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 127 F.2d 53
(6th Cir. 1942).
5. The Washington National Airport is under the control of the Administrator
of Civil Aeronautics. Act of June 29, 1940, § 2, 54 STAT. 688 (1940).
6. Instant case at 549.
7. Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948).
8. The opinion does not specifically deal with the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment, but the court holds separate facilities if unequal a denial of due process,
contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Ken-
tucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900); see Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
344 (1938) ; Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927) ; McCabe v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 160 (1914) ; but cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
10. E.g., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235
U.S. 151 (1914).
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limits the arbitrary regulation of the conduct of the individual, the un-
reasonable regulation is void as violative of due process even if all indi-
viduals are treated equally unreasonably.1 Since the Fifth Amendment
contains no equal protection clause, the constitutionality or unconstitution-
ality of segregation depends on whether the plaintiff has been deprived of
liberty without due process of law. If liberty is defined as freedom from
external restraint or compulsion,12 it might well include non-discriminatory
service in a place of public accommodation. Since racial segregation is sub-
ject to effective attack as arbitrary and unreasonable,13 mere segregation,
regardless of equality of treatment, could be held a denial of due process.
It is difficult to see how separated equal accommodations, if such were pos-
sible, 14 are less a denial of due process than unequal accommodations, for
the denial of liberty would seem to be in the forcible separation itself.
The instant decision strikes a balance between the increasing judicial
concern for minority rights and a reluctance to require that facilities fur-
nished by the federal government be non-segregated as a matter of con-
stitutional right.15 The lower court was unwilling to anticipate the Su-
preme Court even though a decision imposing a constitutional prohibition
against the federal government does not involve the delicate adjustment
of states rights in a federal system implicit in a ruling under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The middle-of-the-road position the court takes is
more understandable in view of the fact that at the time of this decision
segregation at the airport had already been eliminated by order of the
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.' 6 But if courts are unwilling to con-
vert the Fifth Amendment into a Civil Rights Act, a statutory basis for
protection is preferable to mere executive order. Inasmuch as Congress
11. ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK or AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456 (1939).
12. WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 89 (2d ed. 1937). "Personal
liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's
person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or re-
straint unless by due course of law." I BL. CoMM. *134.
13. Although the due process clause does not prohibit governmental regulation
for the public welfare, the regulation may not be arbitrary-it must be a reasonable
means to a permissible end. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
Racial segregation is frequently justified as a police measure in the interests of the
public welfare, i.e., that segregation promotes the public peace by preventing racial
conflicts. While promotion of the peace is a legitimate objective, the reasonableness
of segregation as a means to this end is questionable. It is difficult to show a sub-
stantial relation between the regulation and the purpose supposedly to be attained;
modern sociological findings are that segregation is more conducive to interracial
tension than public peace. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CivIL
RIGHTS 82-87 (1947); McWilliams, Race Discrimination and the Law, 9 SCIENCE
AND SOCIETY 1 (1945) ; see Perez v. Lippold, 108 P.2d 17, 25 (Calif. 1948) ; Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). The presumption of constitutionality, i.e., that
legislation rests on a rational basis, will not be indulged where civil rights are in
question. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
14. The "Separate but Equal" Failure, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MITTEE oN Cvrv RIGHTs 79-82 (1947) ; Brief for the American Jewish Congress as
Amicus Curiae, Henderson v. United States, No. 25, Supreme Court of the United
States, Oct. term, 1949.
15. This is after all a lower federal court sitting in Virginia, and the Supreme
Court has not yet spoken definitely on the exact issue. But recent Supreme Court
decisions indicate a lack of enthusiasm for racial discrimination. See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943) ; Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Dicridmination Since 1937, 49 COL.
L. REv. 201 (1949); Note, Is Racial Segregation Consistent with Equal Protection
of the Laws?, 49 COL. L. REv. 629, 638 (1949).
16. See note 5 supra. 13 FED. REG. 8736 (1948); Air Terminal Services, Inc. v.
Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1949).
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has full power to make regulations concerning the territory of the United
Stites,17 it can and should enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in
places of public accommodation subject to its exclusive jurisdiction, such as
the Washington National Airport."'
Constitutional Law-Enforceability of Restrictive Racial Cove-
nants in an Action for Damages-Plaintiffs, parties under a restrictive
covenant which provided that certain lots should not be sold to negroes,1
brought an action to specifically enforce the agreement, or in the alterna-
tive, to obtain damages for its breach, joining as defendants the white
owners of a lot subject to the restriction and certain negroes to whom
the lot was sold or about to be sold. The trial court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' petition. On appeal the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the
judgment as to a single count for damages directed against the white
owners, and remanded the cause for trial. The court reasoned that while
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Shelley v.
Kraemer 2 provided that such covenants may not be specifically enforced
by state courts because it resulted in "state action" of the sort prohibited
by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that decision
did not bar an action for damages. Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S.W.2d 127
(Mo. 1949).
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendments forbids
any "state' action" which discriminates against an individual. 4 However,
if the individual is a member of a class which is restricted in its rights
or privileges because of some public interest then the constitutional rights
of the individual have not been invaded.5 In Buchanan v. Warley 6 it
was held that there was insufficient public interest to justify the passing
of a racial zoning ordinance even though such a restriction might prevent
17. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 3; I, § 8.
18. Civil Rights in the Nation's Capital, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
mITTEE ON CIvIL RIGHTS 87-95 (1947) ; Message from the President on Civil Rights,
94 CONG. REc. 928 (1948). There is the same need for legislation protecting civil
rights in certain non-contiguous possessions of the United States likewise subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. See NON SELF-GoVERNING TERRimREs:
INFORMATION TRANSMITTED TO SECRETARY GENERAL IN 1946, 121 (U.N. 1947)
(Panama Canal Zone).
1. ". . . none of the lots may be devised, sold, leased or occupied by [sic]
Negroes." See Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1949).
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 provides "... nor shall any State . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Racial cove-
nants could also be declared illegal in state courts as (1) illegal restraints on aliena-
tion; Foster v. Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P.2d 497 (3d Dist. 1933) ; (2) against
public policy; Yoshida v. Gilbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D.&C. 321 (1946); (3)
not the proper subject of the equitable discretionary remedy of specific performance;
see Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 36 (1948) ;
(4) invalid under the supreme law of the land since the United Nations Charter pro-
viding for the equal rights of men has been ratified by the executive and has the full
status of a treaty; see Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA
L. REv. 1 (1948).
4. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). A state statute provided that no
gratuitous passenger in an automobile could recover from the owner or operator for
injuries caused by negligence of the operator. Even though guests in other types of
vehicles were allowed recovery, the statute was not discriminatory since it corrected
abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits in the class of cases where it most
frequently occurred.
6. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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racial conflicts, depreciated property values and miscegenation. 7  Private
restrictive covenants were then increasingly used to maintain racial segre-
gation.8 In Shelley v. Kraemer the Court held that such private agree-
ments were valid even though unreasonably discriminatory as long as the
parties voluntarily adhered to their terms, but that constitutionally pro-
scribed "state action" resulted when a state court enjoined a negro grantee
from taking possession of a restricted lot. The Court had earlier recog-
nized that the action of a state court in enforcing a substantive common
law rule could result in a denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 However, the Shelley v. Kraemer situation presented the
first instance in which the wrong originated in a private contract before the
illegal action by the state judiciary.' 0 The Supreme Court of Missouri
distinguished between an action for "breach" of a covenant and an "en-
forcement" of a covenant by injunctive process and decided that only the
latter was unconstitutional. Perhaps one distinguishing feature of the
principal case is that the white vendor being used for damages is claiming
that the action of the state court is unconstitutional. Does a person not
within the class discriminated against have standing to invoke a consti-
tutional guarantee? In Buchanan v. Warley" it was held that he does
where his rights would be injuriously effected by the "state action" causing
the discrimination. Of course the right of the vendor to convey his prop-
erty free of the restriction is affected in the principal case.
It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v.
Kraemer meant to extend the full reach of the equal protection clause so
as to prevent any judicial redress for violation of a discriminatory covenant.
By allowing an enforcement of the claim for damages, the Missouri court
is helping to foster racial segregation since few sellers whose land is sub-
ject to a racial restriction will convey to negroes if it means they will be
liable for the consequent economic loss in surrounding land values. The
Missouri court was faced with two conflicting ethical ideals. Generally,
when a person covenants to follow a certain course of conduct he is ex-
pected to perform his obligation or be liable for any loss to the parties to
the agreement because of his failure to perform.12  When, however, that
7. This case actually arose under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when a white vendor sued a negro for specific performance of a land
contract. In granting the remedy the court held that the segregation ordinance which
prevented occupancy of the land in question by the negro was an unreasonable state
interference with the alienation rights of the plaintiff. Neither is the classification
reasonable merely because state courts stand ready to enforce covenants excluding
white persons since the right to purchase a parcel of property is guaranteed by the
Constitution to the individual. See Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 21, 22.
8. These agreements arise in two ways; persons holding different pieces of land
mutually agree to the covenant, or the owner of a number of parcels imposes such
a limitation in transferring the land to different grantees. Ming, Racial Restrictions
and the Fourteenth Anwndinent: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. oF CHI. L.
Rzv. 203, 214 (1949).
9. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. 3 ARx. L. Riv. 96 (1949). In Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926)
an injunction was granted against the transfer of a restricted lot in Washington,
D. C., to a negro, but the Fourteenth Amendment was not pertinent to that case.
11. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ; cf. Hurd v. Hodge, supra note 3. In this later District
of Columbia case it was held that white vendors of restricted realty were improperly
enjoined in the lower court from selling to a negro. A statute in effect in the district
provided that all citizens had equal rights to purchase property and the white vendor
had standing to invoke the statutory guarantee in his favor. This is directly analogous
to an invocation of the equal protection clause in the principal case.
12. There may even be the element of deceit involved where the vendor being
sued for damages himself purchased the land knowing he would later sell to negroes.
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promise is to discriminate, the performance of it creates a greater evil
in that the opportunity to purchase a particular parcel of property is made
to depend on the ancestory of the purchaser. This is by its very nature
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality." 13 It has been shown that residential segregation has a detri-
mental social and economic effect on society. 14 It seems to be accepted
that there are no significant innate physical or mental differences between
the average members of different races which would justify the practice. 15
What differences do exist result largely from environmental factors. If
these differences are substantial and cause friction, then the maintenance
of segregation will never afford the opportunity to resolve these differences.
Constitutional Law-Power of State Courts to Regulate the Pro-
cedure for Raising Federal Constitutional Questions-Appellants
decided to test an unwritten policy of the Board of Parks which banned
interracial tennis matches in the City parks. They circulated pamphlets
attacking the Board policy and invited spectators to a prearranged, inter-
racial game. The contest was forcibly halted by the local police, and ap-
pellants were tried and convicted of a conspiracy to breach the peace.'
Defendants appealed, claiming that the verdict was violative of their Con-
stitutional right of free speech and peaceable assembly. The Maryland
Court of Appeals sustained the conviction, holding that the state consti-
tutional provision making the jury in criminal cases the judge of both the
law and facts,2 precluded them from reviewing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. Winkler v. State, 69 A.2d 674 (Md. 1949).
Both the appellate and trial court assumed that the defendants had
a right to engage in an interracial tennis match since there was no ap-
plicable statute, ordinance or rule prohibiting such play.3 Therefore, the
sole basis for sustaining conviction in the instant case would be that ap-
pellants had resorted to illegal means in order to have a just grievance
rectified. Yet it has never been suggested that one must petition for
mandamus to compel recognition of a Constitutional guarantee. Under
our judicial system the time-honored method of testing a disputed right
has been to exercise it and assume the risk of criminal prosecution.4
Furthermore, the acts of the defendants in the instant case are mild by
comparison to the near-riot conditions, recently held by the Supreme Court
in the Terminiello 5 case not to constitute a breach of the peace. The
13. Cf. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Calif. 1948).
14. Racial segregation limits the market for housing available to negroes sub-
jecting them to an artificial scarcity and unreasonably high prices. Once the
boundaries of the colored section are established, little adjustment is later made for
population changes and the resultant overcrowding breeds crime and vice. Ming,
supra note 8, at 203.
15. Perez v. Lippold, supra.
1. Appellants were also indicted for riot but were acquitted on that count.
2. MD. CONST. Art XV, § 5 (1867).
3. Instant case at 678.
4. See Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (1940) ; Douglas v.
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
5. In a meeting called by Gerald L. K. Smith, the speaker delivered a violent
attack on various religious and racial groups. Ice picks, stones and bottles were
thrown and general pandemonium reigned. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949),
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Maryland Court of Appeals ruled, however, that its constitution precluded
them from examining the sufficiency of the evidence. Yet, the court did
acknowledge that an exception would be made when it is affirmatively
shown in any case that the trial was so unfair as to amount to a denial of
due process.6 A more striking example of "unfairness" than that pre-
sented by the instant case is difficult to conceive. Moreover, it is extremely
difficult to comprehend how a court can decide if a trial was violative of
due process without first searching the record to determine whether there
was sufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction. Also inconsistent
is that this same court in a recent case did examine the record to determine
whether "appellant was denied any right guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States." 7 The court finds justification for its anomalous
position in decisions of the Supreme Court which hold that a state has
complete power to regulate the procedure for raising due process ques-
tions in its courts.8 This proposition has been long settled,9 and there can
be little doubt that Maryland could have designated its trial courts as sole
arbiters of Federal Constitutional questions.'0 But as has been pointed
out, Maryland has not adopted that procedure, and it is submitted that noth-
ing in the Supreme Court decisions relied upon sustains a hypertechnical
procedure whereby the highest court of Maryland arbitrarily decides in
which cases it will adjudicate due process questions and in which cases it
will ignore them.'
In the light of the foregoing analysis it would seem that the Supreme
Court will reverse the instant conviction as constituting a denial of due
process. However, this will not alleviate the dilemma of the Maryland
defendant who seeks to assert a denial of a constitutional guarantee. Upon
conviction he cannot directly petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari
since technially he has a right of appeal to a higher state court. Yet,
when he does expend the time and money necessary to prosecute such an
appeal the appellate court may rule that it is precluded from examining the
record. Furthermore, because of an inability to furnish the requisite bail
he may be forced to remain in confinement while going through the mo-
tions of making a completely useless appeal. A possible solution would be
for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the actualities of Maryland
procedure and grant certiorari immediately after the trial. But the Su-
preme Court, as well as the litigant, has no way of foreseeing the vacilla-
tions of Maryland's highest court. Thus, it has no way of determining,
in a particular case, 'whether or not the due process question will be
"dodged" or adjudicated. It is submitted that the only solution is for
Maryland to erase its procedural morass and provide a clear and marked
procedure for the litigation of federal questions.'
2
6. Instant case at 679.
7. Slansky v. State, 63 A.2d 599, 606 (Md. 1949).
8. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
9. Central Union Telephone Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 (1925), cited
with approval in Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
10. But cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 511 (1944), as to the power of
Congress to withhold jurisdiction from the state courts.
11. Since technically Maryland does allow appeal for asserted violations of due
process, it would seem that the supremacy clause of the Constitution mandates that
the federal question be actually adjudicated.
12. See the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S.
561, 567 (1947), as to the effect of procedural confusion in the state courts.
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Contracts-An Administrative Order Relieves the Promisor of
Liability for Non-performance Despite Promisor's Consent to be
Bound by It-The plaintiff contracted with the defendant whereby
the S. S. "Tropic Star" was to carry a thousand tons of copra from
Beria, East Africa to New York City. Prior to plaintiff's contract, the
defendant had entered into an agreement with the United States Maritime
Commission consenting to be bound by the Ship Warrants Act in return
for warrants entitling its ships to priority in the use of port facilities., The
plaintiff was not informed of this agreement nor was there any contractual
stipulation as to liabilities arising under this agreement. The United States
entered World War II before the "Tropic Star" sailed and the Commis-
sion ordered the defendant to substitute wool for plaintiff's copra. Plain-
tiff sued for damages occasioned by the breach and recovered in the Dis-
trict Court.2 On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that the
administrative order made performance of the contract impossible and re-
lieved the defendant of the duty of performance and of liability, despite the
absence of any stipulation against liability arising out of the defendant's
agreement under the Ship Warrants Act. L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal
Norwegian Government, 177 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1949).
The defense of impossibility of performance is a modern and still
developing doctrine founded on the premise that should unforeseeable in-
tervening circumstances make performance a vitally different and more
hazardous undertaking than originally contemplated by the parties, in fair-
ness the risk should not be placed on'the promisor.3 The common law
did not recognize this doctrine and rigidly bound the promisor to perform
his contract or make good his failure.4 However, at an early date it was
recognized that contracts for personal services were excused by death,5
and that a supervening statute making performance illegal discharged a
covenant. 6 It was not until late in the nineteenth century that the courts
extended the defense of impossibility to those situations in which the
subject matter of the contract was destroyed.7 The Kronprinzessin Cecile
case,S decided during World War I, further broadened the defense of
impossibility to include not only a performance rendered theoretically im-
possible by the destruction of the subject matter, but also to situations
where the performance would subject the promisor to much greater risks
than were contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made.
There are two necessary corollaries to the rule as above stated: first, the
1. 50 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. (1940). The Act provides inter alia: the Commission
shall have the power to issue warrants entitling the holder to have priority in the use
of unloading, docking and fueling facilities and in return the holder shall accept the
orders of the Commission as to cargoes carried, voyages made and rates charged.
2. L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Lorentzen, 83 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The
lower court placed its decision on the ground that the promisor alone knew of the
risk of an administrative decision cancelling the carrying of plaintiff's cargo and that
in failing to stipulate against liability the defendant assumed the risk.
3. 6 WiLLrsTox, CONTRACTS § 1931 (Rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§454-469 (1932).
4. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647) ; MCELROY, ImpoS-
SIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE 1 (1941).
5. Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, 1 Cro. Eliz. 552, 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (Q.B. 1597);
Hovey v. Blakeman, 4 Ves. Jr. 596, 31 Eng. Rep. 307 (Ch. 1799).
6. Brewster v. Kitchell, 1 Salk. 198, 91 Eng. Rep. 177 (K.B. 1649).
7. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. (KB. 1863); MCELROY, op.
cit. supra, note 4, at 61. This defense was recognized much earlier in Admiralty, see
ROBINsoN, ADMIRALTY 652-663 (1939).
8. 244 U.S. 12 (1917).
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intervening circumstances must not be foreseeable by the promisor; 9 and
second, there must be no contributing fault on the part of the promisor.' 0
The decision in the instant case limits foreseeability by excluding circum-
stances which should be known to both parties, including only those of
which the promisor alone knows. The opinion further confines the con-
tributing fault of the promisor to his voluntary actions and not to those
acts done under a coercive outside influence.
The rationale of the early English cases was that the promisor might
guard against any risk by contractual stipulations and therefore should be
held to his express promise."t Under the simple economic conditions
existing several centuries ago, such an argument was tenable. However,
to demand that in the rapid present day interchange of goods that all pos-
sible risks be guarded against by written stipulations would be too slow
commerce to the speed which these necessarily complex contracts could be
negotiated.' 2 The court also recognized in the instant case that the de-
fendant was forced by the impact of "total war" on his business affairs to
accept the provisions of a theoretically consensual statute, which was in
reality coercive,1a or chance the loss of invaluable port facilities.' 4 To
hold that this defendant was to sacrifice the use of these facilities to insure
the delivery of the plaintiff's cargo would be to ignore the realities of what
the parties intended by their contract. It is, therefore, highly desirable
that the courts recognize the impact of modern economic conditions on
legal doctrines, and where unfairness results, modify and reappraise the
common law rules.'5
Criminal Law--Self-Defense-Duty to Retreat From Domicile
Before Attack of Invited Guest-Defendant on trial for murder at-
tempted to establish that the killing was in self-defense. Evidence es-
tablished that a meretricious relationship existed between defendant and
her victim and that the victim had been in the habit of spending several
days at a time in the defendant's home. Defendant introduced evidence to
justify the killing which tended to prove that the victim attacked her with
a knife in her home. The court refused to charge that the defendant had
a right to stand her ground in her own home in repelling this attack. On
appeal from a conviction, the judgment was affirmed. State v. Grierson,
69 A.2d 851 (N.H. 1949).
With the exception of a few jurisdictions retaining a vestige of fron-
tier ethics,' the duty to, retreat before a deadly assault as an alternative
to counter action likely to cause death or serious bodily harm is settled in
the law of both torts 2 and crimes.3 Similarly, the right to stand one's
9. Inter-Coast S.S. Co. v. Seaboard Transp. Co., 291 Fed. 13 (1st Cir. 1923):
Lima Locomotive & Machine Co. v. National Steel Casting Co., 155 Fed. 77 (6th
Cir. 1907).
10. Chicago & Eastern Ill. R. Co. v. Collins Produce Co., 249 U.S. 186 (1918);
McDonald v. Rosasco, 20 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1927).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. For the fragmentary nature of this contract in the instant case, see L. N.
Jackson & Co. v. Lorentzen, supra, at 488 n. 1.
13. See CONG. REc. 4288, 5660 (1941).
14. See note 2 supra.
15. Frey, Contract Defaults and Cancellation in Wartime, 38 ILL.. L.R. 167
(1943); Pedrick & Springfield, War Measures and Contract Liability, 20 TEX. L.R.
710 (1942).
1. E.g., Williams v. State, 30 Tex. App. 429, 17 S.W. 107 (1891).
2. See RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 65.
3. See CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW § 68 (3d ed. 1915) and cases therein cited. For
a history of the development of the duty see Beale, Retreat from Murderous Assault,
16 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1921).
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ground within one's own domicile is equally well settled on the theory that
the home is the traditional sanctuary from which an individual can not be
legally compelled to flee.4  Where both victim and defendant live under
the same roof, courts have had more difficulty. Where separate domiciles
can be found for each as in an apartment house, boarding house or hotel,
even though under the same roof, the right of sanctuary has been restricted
to that portion of the premises where the one attacked has exclusive
domain.5 Where such separation is impossible, e.g., members of the same
household, there has been a cleavage in authority. One line of cases looks
to the right of the defendant to sanctuary and finds no policy reason for
negating such right because the agressor has the same domicile.6 The
other line of cases extends the doctrine developed in the hotel cases so
that on a finding that the victim had an equal possession of the premises,
the right of sanctuary is denied.7 The instant case may be sustainable on
authority of the latter line of cases since the victim might be said to be
living in the defendant's home. However, the court in its opinion, indi-
cates that the right of sanctuary is even more limited by stating that the
duty to retreat from an attack by any guest exists whether he is a resident
or not. Thus, a defendant under this decision may only stand his ground
before an intruder.8
Assuming that the right of sanctuary in the domicile is desirable, its
limitation to situations where the victim is an intruder seems tenuous.
The apartment house and hotel cases can be amply explained on the theory
that they limit the meaning of a man's domicile to that portion of a dwell-
ing not available to public use.9  However, the right of sanctuary is one
given to the defendant because of his relationship to the place of attack.
The victim's relationship to this place has, at most an indirect relevance.
Jurisdictions imposing a duty to flee where the victim and defendant have
a common domicile can be justified if the position is taken that the vic-
tim's relationship to the place of the attack affects his relationship to the
defendant making it more reasonable to impose upon such defendant a
duty of flight. The instant case in broadening this duty to flee from the
home as a limitation on the right of sanctuary to situations where the vic-
tim is a guest as well as where he is a resident 10 seems to be unreasonably
extending the doctrine. While purporting to follow the Restatement,,"
the court might well have been thinking in terms of a property interest
in the home since all of the cases from which dictum is taken in support
of its position involve the defense of property interests against admitted
4. Beard v. U.S., 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
5. Compare State v. Dyer, 147 Iowa 217, 124 N.W. 629 (1910) with State v.
Pece, 116 W. Va. 176, 179 S.E. 524 (1935).
6. Baugh v. State, 215 Ala. 619, 112 So. 157 (1927) ; State v. Phillips, 38 Del.
(8 Harr.) 24, 187 Atl. 721 (1936) ; People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496
(1914).
7. Com. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, 62 Atl. 1064 (1906) ; cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 65(2) : ". . . is privileged . . . although the actor reasonably believes he can
safely avoid the necessity . . . (a) by retreating if but only he is attacked within his
dwelling place which is not also the dwelling place of the other . . ." (Italics sup-
plied).
8. Instant case at 854.
9. Huff v. State, 23 Ala. App. 426, 126 So. 417 (1930) (no duty to retreat from
one's own room); State v. Dyer, supra (boarder's domicile does not extend to the
house's dining room where owner of the house was the victim).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Instant case at 855.
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intruders.12 However, there is reason to believe that the limitations on the
right of sanctuary in the home are based upon a loss of vitality in the
concept. A change in such conditions as society's increased valuation of
human life coupled with more adequate public police, making the right
less necessary, may have much to do with the court's willingness to limit
its scope.' 3
Divdrce-Admissibility of Evidence of Adultery Offered to Prove
Indignities-In an action for divorce grounded on the single charge
of indignities to the person, libellant husband testified without corrobora-
tion that on returning home on a certain night he saw respondent in her
bed with another man. There was additional evidence of other indignities
and the lower court granted the divorce despite respondent's categorical
denials. The decree was reversed because it was error to admit testimony
of respondent's adultery to prove the charge of indignities. Allen v. Allen,
165 Pa. Super. 379, 68 A.2d 629 (1949).
In Pennsylvania, divorce can be granted only for a cause plainly
marked by statute;I the alternative grounds include adultery and indig-
nities to the person.2 In Hexamer v. Hexamer the Superior Court said
that the "libellant cannot have a decree of divorce upon any ground other
than that alleged in his libel." 3 There it was clear from the evidence
that the appropriate ground was adultery and not cruelty and indignities as
alleged. However, the rule appeared to have been weakened by recent
decisions 4 which misused the oft-quoted dictum of President Judge Kel-
ler in Lowe v. Lowe.5 "Conduct by a husband with respect to other
women although not sufficient to support a charge of adultery, may be
considered as a form of personal indignity to his wife. . . ." The above
mentioned cases involved evidence which tended to establish adultery but
was admitted to prove indignities. Since adultery may be inferred from
evidence of the occupancy of a bedroom by an unmarried man and woman,
6
mutual occupancy of a bed should be even more conclusive if proved by
evidence of sufficient weight. In the instant case, however, the contra-
dicted and uncorroborated testimony would not have been of sufficient
12. E.g., Bunton v. Davis, 82 N.H. 304, 133 Atl. 16 (1926); Aldrich v. Wright,
53 N.H. 398, 422 (1873) ; State v. Elliott, 11 N.H. 540, 544 (1841).
13. Beale, supra note 2, at 582.
1. Dash v. Dash, 357 Pa. 125, 53 A.2d 89 (1947).
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon, 1930). " . it shall be lawful for
the innocent and injured spouse to obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony,
whenever . . . the other spouse: (c) Shall have committed adultery; or (f) Shall
have offered such indignities to the person of the injured and innocent spouse, as to
render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome."
3. 42 Pa. Super. 226, 239 (1910) ; see Huston v. Huston, 130 Pa. Super. 501, 513,
197 AtI. 774, 779 (1938) (error to admit evidence of improper conduct with men
roomers under charges of indignities and cruelty).
4. Blansett v. Blansett, 162 Pa. Super. 45, 56 A.2d 341 (1948); Macormac v.
Macormac, 159 Pa. Super. 378, 48 A.2d 136 (1946). The development is referred to
in Highley, Developments in the Law of Divorce, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 49 (1949).
5. 148 Pa. Super. 439, 442, 25 A.2d 781, 783 (1942). Judge Keller carefully
restricted his reference to conduct which did not amount to adultery; he did not refer
to evidence merely insufficient to prove adultery. Only two years earlier in Dearth
v..Dearth, 141 Pa. Super. 344, 15 A.2d 37 (1940) he dissented on the ground that
"evidence which is suggestive of adultery but which is wholly insufficient to warrant
a divorce on that ground, is not probative of indignities to the person."
6. Henry v. Henry, 32 Del. Co. 350 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
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weight to support a charge of adultery.7 The case might be considered
a reversion to the strict Hexamer doctrine were it not for the more re-
cent case of Phipps v. Phipps.8 There the Superior* Court affirmed a
decree grounded on indignities and partially supported by corroborated
and uncontradicted testimony of mutual occupany of a hotel bedroom. A
comparison of these two cases indicates that admissibility does not depend
on the weight of the evidence as affected by corroboration and contradic-
tion. The apparently contradictory holdings on admissibility in the in-
stant case and the Phipps case may be reconciled by the logical observa-
tion that mutual occupancy of a bed creates a stronger inference of adultery
than does mutual occupancy of a room containing a bed, the former evi-
dence being inadmissible to prove indignities. It would, therefore, seem
that degree of persuasiveness governs admissibility.
The charge of adultery in a divorce proceeding has several conse-
quences which make it particularly undesirable to permit evidence of
adulterous conduct in support of a different ground. If the paramour
is named in a libel grounded in whole or in part on adultery, he must be
given an opportunity to defend the blackening of his character.9 And the
respondent is under a statutory incapacity to marry the person with whom
the adultery was committed.10 Further, libellant's own adulterous con-
duct is a complete defense to a charge of adultery,"- although not a com-
plete defense to the other ground. 12 However, it may establish the cause
of and justification for the respondent's conduct.' 3 The extent to which
the inference of adulterous conduct has been tolerated in evidence offered
to support other charges has occasioned fear that the above mentioned
considerations were being overlooked.' 4 The instant case is a warning
that the court is sensitive to the recent trend of extending indignities to
include conduct smacking of adultery. It is consistent with the Hexamer
holding; and when set against earlier and subsequent decisions, it sug-
gests that the strength of the inference which can be drawn from the evi-
dence governs its admissibility. It should be noted however, that the
Phipps case may not represent a return to the recent liberal trend since
there was other evidence sufficient in itself to establish a course of indig-
nities.' 5 This may explain the different treatment accorded the similar
evidence in the two cases. It may also explain the apparent failure of the
court in the Phipps case to buttress the position proclaimed in the in-
stant case.
7. "A decree may be supported by the testimony of complainant alone, but if this
testimony be contradicted and shaken by the respondent and there be no convincing
circumstances warranting a disregard of the contradictory evidence, a case has not
been made out." Rommel v. Rommel, 87 Pa. Super. 511, 513 (1926).
8. Phipps v. Phipps, 165 Pa. Super. 622, 70 A.2d 415 (1950).
9. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 38 (Purdon Supp., 1948). Superseded by Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules 1136 and 1459 requiring that notice be given to the named
correspondent.
10. PA. STAT. AN., tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon, 1930).
11. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 52 (Purdon, 1930).
12. Clark v. Clark, 160 Pa. Super. 562, 52 A.2d 351 (1947) (adultery by libellant
after a cause of action arose for indignities).
13. Commonwealth ex rel. Cartmell v. Cartmell 164 Pa. Super. 108, 63 A.2d 691
(1949); commented on in 97 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 905 (1949).
14. See Beggs v. Beggs, 57 Pa. D.&C. 487, 489 (1946).
15. Phipps v. Phipps, supra at 625, 70 A.2d at 416. If mutual occupation of the
hotel room "had been the only evidence of misconduct on the part of respondent, we
would readily agree" that the lower court should have granted the motion to strike
on the ground "that you cannot establish indignities by proving adultery."
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Income Taxation-Corporate Transactions-Sale by Stockhold-
ers of Assets Received in Partial Liquidation of Closely Held Cor-
poration Not Taxable to Corporation-The shareholders of a closely
held utility corporation offered to sell all their stock to a cooperative.
The cooperative refused but proposed to purchase a part of the assets
directly from the corporation. This offer was rejected by the corpora-
tion, admittedly because such a transaction would result in a heavy capital
gains tax to it. Thereupon the shareholders negotiated with the coopera-
tive and offered to acquire the desired assets and sell them to the coopera-
tive. After the cooperative's acceptance of the offer, the corporation trans-
ferred these assets to the shareholders as liquidating dividends in kind.
The corporation was dissolved subsequent to the transfer of the assets to
the cooperative by the shareholders. Rejecting the Commissioner's con-
tention that the shareholders had been used as a mere conduit for effec-
tuating a corporate sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of
the Court of Claims'. that the sale to the cooperative was made by the
shareholders and no taxable gain was realized by the corporation. Re-
covery of the tax assessed and collected from the corporation was allowed.
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 280 (1950).
The sale of a capital asset by a corporation for an amount exceeding
its basis will result in realized gain by the corporation.2 However, if a
complete or partial distribution in kind is made to the shareholders, the
corporation realizes no taxable income.3 Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.4 was the first case decided by the Supreme Court involving the tax
consequences of a distribution of assets to the shareholders of a closely
held corporation immediately followed by a sale to a single buyer, the
Court affirming the Tax Court holding5 that the sale was in fact made
by the corporation. Actually the decision was a Dobson 6 ruling, but the
Court added language 7 which resulted in confusion in the lower courts.
The Court Holding Co. case has been interpreted as resting upon the fact
that the corporation initiated negotiations for the sale of the assets prior
to the distribution to its shareholders 8 or upon the determined purpose
1. Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl.
1949).
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-18 (1943).
3. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-20 (1943).
4. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
5. 2 T.C. 531 (1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944).
6. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) (special weight given to Tax
Court decisions). But cf. INT. Rnv. CODE § 1141(a), as amended by 62 STAT. 991
(1948) (circuit courts to review Tax Court decisions in same manner and extent as
district court decisions in civil actions without jury).
7. 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) : "The incidence of taxation depends upon the sub.
stance of a transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from the sale
of property are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to transfer
legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from
the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale
by one person cannot be transferred for tax purposes into a sale by another by using
the latter as a conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax lia-
bilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress."
8. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1949) (sale by corporation);
United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948) (sale by
shareholders) ; Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1947) (sale by shareholders) ; Fairfield S. S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946) (corporation subjected to tax);
Steubenville Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 789 (1948) (sale by shareholders) ;
Cooper Foundation v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 389 (1946) (sale by shareholders). '
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of the entire transaction to avoid corporate taxation.9 The instant case
recognizes that the fact finding tribunal may make a distinction with
variant tax consequences between the situation where negotiations are
made by the officers in behalf of the corporation prior to a distribution in
kind to themselves as shareholders, as in Court Holding Co., and, on the
other hand, where the negotiations are made by the officers 10 in behalf of
themselves as shareholders, even though made prior to distribution, as in
the instant case. Acknowledging that the intent to avoid corporate taxes
is relevant in determining whether the corporation or shareholders made
the sale,'1 the opinion is couched in generalities, and, strictly considered,
merely reaffirms the principle that determination of the factual category
is for the lower tribunal.
Unless the distribution is completed prior to any negotiations for a
sale,12 there is an indication that the sale was by the closed corporation, for
any other transaction is generally undertaken with a view to minimize
taxes. Thus, little reliance should be placed upon the instant decision as
establishing an approved method of avoiding double taxation. A legis-
lative proposal would relieve the corporation from capital gains tax for the
sales of assets in the process of terminating the business.13 Since the ap-
preciation occurred while the assets were held by the corporation during
the course of its regular business activities, such a proposal is open to
criticism. The opposing view is represented by suggestions recommending
elimination of the exclusion from taxation of corporate gains on distribu-
tions of dividends in kind, and the adoption of a provision that transfers
to persons other than shareholders within a given time will result in tax-
able gain to the corporation.14 This last proposal is analogous to the case
law trend to apply tax statutes to the substance and not to the form of
transactions, as is illustrated by taxing a transferor when there is a trans-
fer with the expectation of immediate income to the transferee.' 5 Under
such a theory, this corporation should have been subjected to the tax.
From the viewpoint of facilitating tax administration, Congress should
enact one of these proposals, for the Court has done little to clear the
confusion following the Court Holding Co. case.
Income Taxation-Gratuitous Assignment of Royalties to Be
Paid From Literary Productions-P. G. Wodehouse, famous English
humorist, executed assignments to his wife of an undivided one half in-
9. Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947)
(sale by corporation); Guinness v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1947),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948) (sale by corporation).
10. The cooperative negotiated with L. S. Mayes and W. L. McComas when
offering to buy the assets from the corporation. They, as officers, employed an
accounting firm to determine the tax consequences. In refusing the offer, Mayes and
McComas counter-offered with the scheme ultimately adopted. 83 F. Supp. 843, 846
(Ct. Cl. 1949).
11. Instant case at 282 n.3.
12. See Ripy Bros. Distillers v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 326 (1948); J. T. S.
Brown's Son Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 840 (1948).
13. Proposed Revenue Revision Act of 1948, H.R. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1948) ; H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948).
14. See Note, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 484, 493 (1950).
15. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S,
112 (1940).
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terest in stories which he had written.1 The author's American agent
shortly thereafter licensed to the Curtis Publishing Company for a lump
sum payment the Canadian as well as the American publication rights to
the stories, but reserved solely to the taxpayer all rights after publication.
Although the publisher was not notified of the joint ownership arrange-
ment,2 the sale proceeds were deposited by the author's agent to the sepa-
rate credit of the taxpayer and his wife. The nonresident alien author
contended that the income attributable to the sale of the Canadian publi-
cation rights must be excluded in computing the amount of his domestic
income,3 and that as a result of the assignment to his wife only one half
of such domestic income should be includible in his taxable income. The
Tax Court refused to allocate any amount of the proceeds to the Canadian
rights,4 and included the entire proceeds in the taxpayer's income on the
ground that the purported assignment was merely an attempt to divert a
portion of his future income to his wife. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the taxpayer was only tax-
able for one half of the proceeds since the assignment transferred to the
wife an absolute one half interest in the stories. Wodehouse v. Comm'r,
177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1950). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, however, on the identical factual situation involving the sale of
different stories by the same taxpayer agreed with the Tax Court that the
assignment was ineffectual for federal income tax purposes.5 Wodehouse
v. Corr'r, CCH 1950 FED: TAX REP. 9123 (4th Cir. 1950).
It early became established by virtue of Lucas v. Earl 6 that a gratui-
tous assignment of future earnings for personal services to be rendered by
the taxpayer was ineffectual to divert the tax liability from the donor.
The doctrine of this case was extended in Helvering v. Eubank 7 to a
1. Comm'r v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1947) (royalties paid for the American
rights in the story of a nonresident alien author are taxable to him under INT. REV.
CODE § 211 (a) (1) (A)).
2. This fact was deemed significant to the Tax Court. 8 T.C. 637, 651 (1947).
3. As a nonresident alien, the taxpayer was taxable only on income from sources
in the United States. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 119, 212. The Tax Court, however, has re-
peatedly held that such a lump sum payment for the sale of domestic and foreign
rghts is includible in the taxpayer's domestic income, in absence of clear proof show-
ing a definite ascertained value of the foreign rights. E.g., Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637,
653 (1947); Rohmer, 5 T.C. 183 (1945); Est. of Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942).
Such unequivocable proof has been met only where the parties have expressly stipu-
lated the agreed value for the foreign rights. Although the court has conceded that
the foreign rights have some independent value, it has held that testimony show-
ing the relative circulation in domestic and foreign countries and expert opin-
ion as to comparative value of the foreign rights afford no reliable basis for allo-
cation. E.g., Wodehouse v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 637 (1947), aff'd, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1950), rev'd, CCH 1950 FED. TAx REP. 19123; Rohmer v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 183, 188
(1945), aff'd, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1945).
4. See note 2 supra. The refusal to allocate seems largely a matter of con-
venience; the Tax Court has stated that the parties themselves are best able to make
a proper allocation of the respective values. Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637, 654 (1947).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court. But see
Swan, J. dissenting on this point at 177 F.2d 881, 883 (2d Cir. 1950). The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Tax Court's approach
and held that the court cannot disregard the income paid for foreign rights merely
because there is difficulty in assigning a definite value thereto. CCH 1950 FED. TAx
REP. 9123 (4th Cir. 1950).
5. The court, however, reversed and remanded the case to the Tax Court for a
determination of the value of the foreign rights.
6. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
7. 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (the taxpayer, an insurance agent, made an absolute
assignment of future renewal commissions on policies already written).
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situation where the taxpayer made an absolute assignment of his con-
tractual right to receive income previously earned, though he had divorced
himself from any control over the future receipt of the income. Thus
apparently there is no means by which a taxpayer can give away compen-
sation for his services so as to avoid including that compensation in his
taxable income. On the other hand, however, it is recognized that income
accruing after the donor completely and irrevocably transfers income pro-
ducing property to another is taxable to the donee.8 The retention of
substantial control by the donor over the income producing property,
however, renders the transfer ineffectual for federal income tax purposes
on the theory that the donor has not changed his economic relationship
to the income.9 Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
viewed the literary productions in the instant case as income producing
property,10 rather than the right to future compensation for personal serv-
ices, they saw occasion to distinguish Helvering v. Eubank on the ground
that the instant taxpayer had no contract right to royalties when he made
the gift to his wife."' The Lucas v. Earl doctrine of the "realization" of
income created by the personal services of the taxpayer apparently was
thought inapplicable. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
viewed the literary productions as income producing property, but they
found that the author had retained important incidents of ownership and
control over the entire productions, especially evidenced by the sole right
vested in him to reacquire valuable rights in the stories. Therefore, the
court concluded that the substance of the transaction was merely an at-
tempt to divert a portion of his future income to his wife.' 2 It was con-
sidered immaterial that the purported assignment was made before, rather
than after, the assured sale of the novels.
Although the federal income tax recognizes the husband-wife team
as an economic unit for the tax years after 1947,.a the dominant family
producer may still attempt to achieve the benefit of the lower surtax rates
by the gratuitous assignment of his income to other family members. It
seems desirable in achieving the objective of a tax designed to reach ability
to pay that the taxpayer remain taxable on income which he gives away
when he retains the important benefits of actual receipt.' 4 The instant
factual situation seems illustrative of such a doctrine since the assignment
to the wife was made shortly before the assured sale of the novels. The
8. Anthony v. Comn'r, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946); Austin v. Comm'r, 161
F2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Blair v. Conn'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
9. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Harrison v. Shaffner, 312 U.S. 579
(1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
10. 177 F.2d 881, 884-885 (2d Cir. 1950), wherein Swan, J. states, "The situa-
tion as we view it is no different than when a husband conveys to his wife a half
interest in real estate. . .
11. But see Clark, J. dissenting, supra at 885, "and my brothers concede, as in
the light of Helvering v. Eubank, they must, that if Wodehouse had given his wife
a half interest in the royalties after he had sold the novel, the income would be taxable
to him."
12. CCH 1950 FEn. TAx REP. 9123 (4th Cir. 1950).
13. T. REv. CoDE §§ 12(d), 51(b).
14. An alternative principle has been suggested that the gift in itself accomplishes
realization of income. See I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 15 (farmer who contributed
wheat to a charity was instructed to include in his gross income the fair market value
of the wheat at the time of the gift) ; I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. BuL.T 7 (farmer who
gave cattle to his son was taxable on fair market value at the date of the gift). For
an excellent analysis of the gratuitous assignment of income problem in relation to
family partnerships, see Bruton, Family Partnership and the Income Tax-The Cul-
bertson Chapter, 98 U. O. PA. L. Rv. 143 (1949).
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substance of the transaction therefore clearly reveals that the taxpayer
realized the entire sale proceeds for federal income tax purposes as much
as if he had collected the royalties and paid them over to the object of
his bounty. In light of the apparent realities of the situation it seems that
the treatment accorded the instant gratuitous assignment by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is more desirable. This result seems
buttressed by the fact that the literary productions merely represent the
right to future compensation because of the personal talent and ability of
the author, thus coming within the authority of Lucas v. Earl.
Patents-Violation of Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense to a Suit
for Royalties-Defendant was granted a ten year non-exclusive
license which permitted it to use all of plaintiff's 700 odd patents and patent
applications in exchange for a percentage of gross sales, providing such
sum exceeded a stated minimum.' Allegedly plaintiff endeavored to ex-
tend its patent control and eliminate competition by the acquisition of rival
patents, tying-in undesired patents in all agreements,2 and forcing manu-
facturers to accept licenses on invalid patents. Defendant contended that
such monopolistic practices precluded recovery of royalties; however, on
motion for summary judgment, the court, assuming arguendo that the
practices existed, refused to entertain the defense since the licensing con-
tract upon which the suit was brought was not an integral part of the
illegal activity. Automatic Radio Manufacture Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1949).
Natural justice and equity dictates that a recipient of benefits under a
contract should not be relieved of his correlative obligations merely be-
cause another has engaged in illegal business activity.3 Public interest,
however, supersedes individual rights where the contract is an integral
part of an illegal scheme.4  Manifestly this condemns agreements which
form the cohesive element between conspirators.5 The court in addition
has indicated that a contract will be unenforceable if judicial approval would
serve to consummate plaintiff's illegal objectives. 6 Where a combination
seeks to raise prices, enforcement of their contracts of sale would appear
to condone the enhanced price; however, on similar facts the court rejected
the defense in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.7  More recently, the
1. Defendant contested the validity of this agreement since it extended the
monopoly to unpatented goods. The court held this to be a legal basis on which to
compute royalties. Accord: Ohio Citizens Trust Co. v. Air-Way Electric Appliance
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ohio 1944).
2. New York, in a similar suit by the same plaintiff, held this to be a valid defense
if proved. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. De Wald Radio Mfg. Corp., 194 Misc. (Sup.
Ct.) 81, 84 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1948).
3. Small Co. v. Lamborn, 267 U.S. 248 (1925); Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U.S. 540 (1902).
4. The Sherman Act declares any contract in restraint of trade unenforceable.
26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1940). Agreements seeking to accomplish
illegal ends which would be consummated by the judgment sought are illegal under
the act. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight and Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909) ;
cf. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). See Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947).
5. However, the fact he is a conspirator does not necessarily render the contract
unenforceable. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. 242 (8th
Cir. 1906).
6. See Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947).
7. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
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victim of price discrimination was held liable on his notes, given under a
sales contract, even though the unpaid amount approximated the illegal
price differential. 8 Since such discrimination can only be accomplished by
making a contract, this agreement would also appear to be an integral
part of the illegality. Thus, the mere existence of an illegally enhanced
price in a contract will not render it unenforceable, although judicial ap-
proval appears to consummate the prohibited objectives. However, in
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight and Sons,9 the court refused to
enforce a contract of sale. Although the combination was substantially
similar to that involved in the Connolly case, one important factor was
added. All jobbers were forced, by economic power gained from a 98%
monopoly, to sign requirements contracts compelling them to deal exclu-
sively with the combination. As these agreements were part of the illegal
scheme the court held that enforcement of the sales contract would condone
the larger agreement and further the overall plan. The defense then seems
to be confined to cases where defendant is a member of the conspiracy or
tied to it by a relationship other than the contract in suit.10
The existing authority indicates that patent licenses will be considered
collateral to patentee's monopolistic scheme." The instant facts, however,
indicate that the licensing contract was a direct outgrowth of the forbidden
practices. Plaintiff extended his control beyond the legal monopoly given
by his patents 12 and through the economic power thus gained forced com-
pliance with his mandate. In addition, defendant is inextricably bound to
the general plan by a long term license under which royalties accrue even
though the patents are not used. Since plaintiff's scheme embraced this
comprehensive licensing system, it is dubious whether this contract is, as a
matter of law, not an integral part of the plan. While the decision pre-
vents licensees from invoking minute inquiries into patentee's business ac-
tivities as a subterfuge to avoid payment and forces them to seek compen-
sation for injuries from existing remedies provided by statute, these advan-
tages have not deterred the introduction of similar defenses in analogous
fields. Patent misuse is available as a defense to both direct 13 and con-
tributory infringers, 14 even though the trial may be protracted; furthermore,
such a defense creates an extra-statutory sanction which augments the
difficult and expensive triple-damage remedy. The patent system as a force
8. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., supra. The dissent argued that de-
fendant should be allowed to prove the extent of his loss arising from the discrimina-
tion and not be forced into a treble damage suit.
9. 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
10. The distinguishing feature of the Contiinental case is that defendant was a
member of the combination, not willingly, but in that he agreed to purchase from
none but the members. See International Harvester Co. v. Oliver, 192 Fed. 59, 66
(E.D. Ky. 1911).
11. Gas Products v. Champlin Refining Co., 46 F.2d 511 (E.D. Me. 1931); see
Turner v. Hartford Empire, 173 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1949); Alden-Rochelle v.
A.S.C.A.P., 80 F. Supp. 888, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In Hartford Empire v. U.S.,
323 U.S. 386 (1945), the court refused to force a combination of patentees, who had
violated the Sherman Act, to forfeit their patents- and permitted the reservation of
reasonable royalties.
12. Several recent cases state that the illegal extension of a patent monopoly
permeates and vitiates the royalty covenant. See Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic
Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 401 (1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 329
U.S. 402, 407 (1947). However, these cases are distinguishable since conditions in
the license contract were unreasonable restraints of trade if the patent was invalid.
13. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
14. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
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for national economic development has been questioned recently 15 and to
allow the defense in the instant case would harmonize with the present
trend to delimit patent monopolies where they impinge on the policy of the
anti-trust laws.""
Statutory Interpretation-Applicability of Federal Tort Claims
Act to Leased Bases-Decedent was killed in an airplane crash at a
Newfoundland airbase leased by Great Britain to the United States.' An
action for wrongful death was subsequently brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence on the part of the United States.
This Act, which waives the government's traditional immunity from suit,
is inapplicable by its terms to "any claim arising in a foreign country." 2
The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit,3 held this section of the Act bars a suit against the United States
since Newfoundland is a "foreign country." The Court reasoned that
"foreign country" denotes territory subject to the sovereignity of another
nation. Leased bases are under British sovereignty.4  Therefore, this
base is a "foreign country," and the Act does not apply. United States v.
Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
The real significance of the instant case can only be grasped in the
light of the Court's five-to-four decision in Vermilya-Brown v. Connell,'
wherein the identical problem of the geographical applicability of a federal
statute to a leased base was before the Court.6 In this latter case, the
majority held the Fair Labor Standards Act, applicable by its terms to
"territories and possessions of the United States," 7 applied to leased bases.
The apparent inconsistencies in the two results can easily be explained by
the different policy considerations underlying the two federal statutes in
question.8 However, these factors do not account for the change in the
Court's line of reasoning in the instant case. The majority in Vermilya-
Brown reasoned that the word "possessions" in the Fair Labor Standards
Act was ambiguous and incapable of a fixed definition, and therefore the
problem was one of statutory interpretation. The dissent, on the other
hand, argued that the term "possessions" was not ambiguous, but capable
of a precise definition, and that the only question was whether leased bases
came within this definition. Thus, in deciding the instant case, the Court
could have consistently held "foreign country" in the Tort Act to be am-
15. HAMILTON, PATENTS AND Fan.s ENTERPRISE (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
16. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Morton
Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
1. 55 STAT. 1560 (1941). For discussion of leased bases see Vermilya-Brown v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) ; 97 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 866, 870 (1949).
2. 62 STAT. 985 (1948), 28 U.S.C. App. II §2680(k) (Supp. 1948).
3. Spelar v. United States, 171 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948).
4. Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, supra at 380.
5. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
6. For full discussion of this problem see Note, Applicability of Federal Statutes
to Noncontiguous Areas, 97 U. or PA. L. Rav. 866 (1949).
7. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1946).
8. Since Fair Labor Standards Act is remedial in nature, the courts tend to give
it a liberal construction to make it apply as far as possible, however a waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit has been traditionally narrowly construed. Instant
case at 221.
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biguous and decide again on the policy of the particular statute before it.9
Instead, the Court now saw fit to give "foreign country" a precise mean-
ing, not at all limited to this particular statute or case. This results in
the adoption by the Court of the line of reasoning of the Vermilya-Brown
dissent. This reversal of the Court's previous rationale can probably be
explained by the death of two majority Justices in the prior case.
Under Vermilya-Brown reasoning, confusion reigned, for there was
no standard which could be used in deciding whether other similarly worded
statutes were applicable to leased bases, occupied areas, and trusteeship ter-
ritories. Nothing short of a Supreme Court decision on each of the ap-
proximately sixty-three similarly worded statutes would give a definite
answer as to just where these acts applied.10 Though unable to correct
the harshness of its reasoning in so far as statutes using language identical
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, for to do so would be to overrule the
Vermilya-Brown case completely, the Court has at least limited that de-
cision to that particular phraseology. As for statutes using language simi-
lar to the Tort Claims Act, i.e., "foreign country," there is now complete
certainty, thus assuring that this meaning will be employed with respect
to all such worded statutes. The advantages of the reasoning in the in-
stant case, as noted, are readily apparent. Much litigation is avoided. Since
the definition of "foreign country" turns on the presence or absence of
sovereignty-a political question "--it now remains for the political depart-
ments charged initially with the administration of these extra-territorial
areas to say just where this country has sovereignty, and then the conclu-
sion as to where the statutes apply must follow as a matter of course. Such
an approach should result in administrative efficiency and certainty of
activity. It is submitted that the complete solution to the problem of geo-
graphical applicability of federal statutes to noncontiguous areas lies in-
itally with Congress, who can avoid this confusion merely by being more
explicit in designating the precise areas intended to be covered by the vari-
ous statutes.
Trade Marks and Trade Names-Application of Massachusetts
Legislation Codifying the "Dilution Theory"-In 1935, plaintiff, a
Pennsylvania corporation, entered the retail grocery business and in
ensuing years built up a vast chain of supermarkets using the trade name,
"Food Fair." It was approved to carry on its business in Massachusetts
but, although it had negotiated to acquire sites, it had failed to open a
store there. Defendant, fully aware of plaintiff's business and trade name,
opened a supermarket in Boston late in 1947 and advertised it, also, as
the "Food Fair." Plaintiff sued for an injunction against defendant's
use of its non-registered trade name. The court here affirmed a decree
of the district court enjoining defendant's employment of that name sim-
pliciter, but permitting its use when prefixed by a descriptive term, such as
"Brookline" or "New England." Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair,
Inc., 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949).
9. In Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 602, 614 (U.S. 1850) the court ruled an occupied
area to be a "foreign country" within the meaning of a statute while stating elsewhere
in the same opinion that there was no question that the United States had sovereignty
in the area.
10. For a compilation of sixty-three statutes using the territories-and-possessions
formula, see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra at 398 n. 11 (dissenting opinion).
11. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
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Historically, the courts of Massachusetts have held to a very restricted
concept of unfair competition in the trade mark field and have refused
injunctive relief unless the parties were "soliciting the same trade from
the same customers in the same territory." 1 Such was the rule which
obtained elsewhere in this country at the beginning fo the present century.2
Recognition of the value and economic importance of trade marks, how-
ever, brought about more liberal views. The use of another's mark on a
related, though non-competitive, product was deemed to give rise to con-
fusion in the public's mind as to the source of the product, the evil to be
averted, and permitted the granting of an injunction. 3 The liberal trend was
carried so far by some courts that the requisite confusion was found in
the mental association of even unrelated goods bearing the same mark.
4
One manifestation of this extension was the so-called "dilution theory"
which gave to the owner of a celebrated trade mark a right to injunctive
relief merely because the psychological demand-creating value of his mark
was diminished through its use on any other product anywhere.5 Recent
cases, however, reject these more extreme views 6 and seem to indicate
some narrowing of the protection of trade marks.
7
While this growth was taking place in the law of unfair competition,
the courts of Massachusetts were marking time. Their failure to align
themselves with the progressive developments in other jurisdictions led to
adoption by the state legislature, in 1947, of a statute granting seemingly
very broad protection.8 Novel features of this statute were its codification
of the dilution theory 9 and an express provision that the absence of com-
petition or confusion of source should have no effect upon the trade mark
1. See Note, 27 B.U.L. REv. 489 and cases cited there.
2. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (7th
Cir. 1912) ; George v. Smith, 52 Fed. 830 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
3. Anheuser-Busch v. Budweiser Malt Products, 295 Fed. 306 (2d Cir. 1923);
Akron-Overland Tires Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. .674 (3d Cir. 1921);
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917); NIxs, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 221 h (4th ed. 1947).
4. Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925); Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924); Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
5. This idea was brought into American law by Frank I. Schechter in an article
in which he acclaimed the preservation of uniqueness of a mark the only rational
basis for its protection. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. Rxv. 813 (1927). The most famous case applying this theory, perhaps, is
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1932),
aff'd 237 App. Div. 801 (1st Div. 1932); aff'd 262 N.Y. 282, 188 N.E. 30 (1933)
(jewelry and motion pictures). See also, Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahiti, 166 F.2d
348 (9th Cir. 1948); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa.
1941).
6. See Wyzanski, J., trial judge in the instant case, in National Fruit Product
Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 508 (D. Mass. 1942).
7. See, Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 959 (2d
Cir. 1943). See also Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade S3mbols, 57 YAtE L. J. 1165, 1196 (1948). Restriction of trade mark pro-
tection also seems to result from a rigid enforcement of anti-trust policies. California
Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947);
Borchart, Are Trademarks an Anti-Trust Problem?, 31 GEo. L. J. 245 (1943); see
also Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition, 53 YALE L.J. 514, 541 (1944).
8. MAss. ANN. LAws, C. 110, § 7A (Supp. 1947): "Likelihood of injury to
business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-
mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief . . . notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services."
(Italics added).
9. See italics in note 8, supra.
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owner's right to an injunction. In view of the current tendency of the
courts to narrow trade mark protection, as noted above, it would appear
that in enacting a statute providing such extensive protection, the Massa-
chusetts legislature overshot its mark by carrying the law of that state
beyond that which generally prevails elsewhere. The decisions in the in-
stant case represent the first judicial interpretation of the new act. Both
courts stress that there no longer need be competition between the par-
ties. The most significant aspect of these opinions, however, is the off-
hand manner in which the dilution clause is treated. The district court
decided the case primarily upon the basis of injury to plaintiff's reputa-
tion" and employed the clause merely as an alternate ground for relief,
explicitly refusing to determine the outward boundary of application of this
theory.'1 The appellate court barely mentioned dilution and did so only
to introduce its statement that competition is no longer of the essence.'
2
In almost passing over the most prominent feature of the new act, the
courts reflected judicial repugnance to employment of the dilution theory
even in the presence of legislation warranting its application. This would
seem to be a clear indication that the force of this theory is about spent.
10. See, Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.
Mass. 1949).
11. Ibid.
12. Instant case at 185.
